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Fiss: In Honor of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: Brennan's Faith

BRENNAN'S FAITH
OWEN FISS"

Retirements are odd events. They stir feelings of both joy and sadness, and
that is emphatically true of Justice Brennan's. He served the Court for nearly
thirty-four years and retired with a grandeur that is indeed stunning. The
tributes have been lavish and almost unending. In this, there is reason for joy
because the Justice fully deserves all the accolades and honors that have been
bestowed upon him. I rejoice in Brennan's glory and feel the pleasures of the
moment, but I would be less than honest if I did not also acknowledge my
sadness at his departure from the Court, not just for the Justice who so loved his
work, but even more for the law.
Justice Brennan took his seat on the Court in 1956. Brown v. Board of
Education had already been announced, but its fate hung in the balance.
Resistance to the decision mounted. Jim Crow refused to budge. Schools, jobs,
housing, and places of public accommodation were segregated, or placed off
bounds to blacks altogether. Blacks were also systematically disenfranchised and
excluded from juries. The situation outside of race was also ugly. Statefostered religious practices, like school prayers, were pervasive. Legislatures
were grossly gerrymandered and malapportioned. McCarthyism stifled radical
dissent, and the jurisdiction of the censor over matters considered obscene or
libelous had no constitutional limits. The heavy hand of the law threatened
those who publicly provided information and advice concerning contraceptives,
thereby imperiling the most intimate of human relationships. The states virtually
had a free hand in the administration of justice. Trials often proceeded without
counsel or jury. Convictions were allowed to stand even though they turned on
illegally seized evidence or on statements extracted from the accused under
coercive circumstances. There were no rules limiting the imposition of the
death penalty. These practices victimized the poor and disadvantaged, as did the
welfare system, which was administered in an arbitrary and oppressive manner.
The capacity of the poor to participate in civic activities was also limited by the
imposition of poll taxes, court filing fees, and other barriers.
These were the challenges that the Supreme Court took up in the late 1950s
and in the 1960s. The Court measured everyday life against the lofty ideals of
the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments. The result was a program
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of constitutional reform almost revolutionary in its aspiration and, now and then,
in its achievements. Of course the Court did not act in a political or social
vacuum. It drew on broad-based social formations like the civil rights and
welfare rights movements.
The Court also looked to the executive and
legislative branches for support. The dual school system of Jim Crow could not
have been dismantled without the troops in Little Rock, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the interventions of the Department of Justice and HEW, the suits of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, or the black citizens who dared to become
plaintiffs or, even more, to break the color line or march on behalf of their
rights. The sixties would not have been what they were without the involvement
of all these institutions and persons, and the world would have looked very
different. Yet the truth of the matter is that it was the Supreme Court that
spurred the great changes to follow, and inspired and protected those who sought
to implement them.
A constitutional program so daring and so bold was, of course, the work
of many minds. As is customary, we use the name of the Chief Justice to refer
to this period of Supreme Court history, and in the case of Earl Warren, who
served as Chief Justice from 1954 to 1969, that practice seems especially
appropriate. Warren was a man of great dignity and vision, in every respect a
leader, who discharged his duties (even the most trivial, such as admitting new
members to the bar) with a grace and cheerfulness that were remarkable. He
presided in a way that filled the courtroom with a glow. Yet the substance of
the Court's work, the revolution that it effectuated in our understanding of the
Constitution, drew on the talents and ideas of all those who found themselves
entrusted with the judicial power at that unusual moment of history.
Justice Brennan's contribution to the ensemble known as the Warren Court
had many dimensions. He was devoted to the values we identify with that
institution - equality, procedural fairness, freedom of speech, and religious
liberty - and was prepared to act on them. More importantly, he was the
justice primarily assigned the task of speaking for the Warren Court. The
overall design of the Court's position may have been the work of several minds,
fully reflecting the contributions of such historic figures as Hugo Black, William
Douglas, and Earl Warren, but it was Justice Brennan who by and large
formulated the principle, analyzed the precedents, and chose the words that
transformed the ideal into law. Like any master craftsman, he left his distinctive
imprint on the finished product.
Warren and Brennan were invariably on the same side in the great
constitutional cases of the sixties. They served together for thirteen terms and
agreed in 89 percent of the more than 1400 cases they decided. Indeed, it is
hard to think of a case of any import where they differed. As Chief Justice,
Warren had the responsibility of assigning the task of speaking for the Court
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when his side prevailed. Sometimes, as in Reynolds v. Sims and Miranda v.
Arizona, where he felt the need for the imprimatur of his office, or where the
issue was especially close to his heart, Warren wrote the opinion. But generally
he turned to Justice Brennan.
In part, this reflected the unusual personal tie that developed between the
two. I clerked for Justice Brennan during the October 1965 Term and at that
time the Chief - as Justice Brennan always called him - frequently visited
Justice Brennan. Each visit was an important occasion for the chambers as a
whole and for Justice Brennan in particular. One could see at a glance the
admiration and affection that each felt for the other. The relationship between
Earl Warren and William Brennan was one of the most extraordinary
relationships between two colleagues that I have ever known; surely, it must be
one of the most famous in the law.
But more than personal sentiment was involved. In turning to Brennan,
Warren could be certain that the task of writing the opinion for the Court was
in the hands of someone as thoroughly devoted as he was to the Court as an
institution. An assignment is always an expression of trust, and Warren could
depend on Brennan to formulate and express the Court's position - to declare
the principle and attend to the details that constitute the law - in a way that
would strengthen the Court in the eyes of both the public and the profession, and
thus enhance its capacity to do its great work. Brennan was, in the highest and
best sense of the word, a statesman: not a person who tempers principle with
prudence, but rather someone who is capable of grasping a multiplicity of
conflicting principles, some of which relate to the well-being of the institution
and remind the judge that his duty is not just to speak the law, but also to see
to it that it becomes an actuality - in the words of Cooper v. Aaron, to make
sure that the law becomes "a living truth."
Brennan could be trusted to choose his words in a way that would minimize
the disagreement among the justices, not only to avoid those silly squabbles that
might interfere with the smooth functioning of a collegial institution, as the
Court most certainly is, but also to produce a majority opinion and strengthen
the force of what the Court had to say. Only five votes are needed for a
decision to become law, but the stronger the majority and broader the consensus,
the more plausible is its claim for authority. Brennan could also be trusted to
respect the traditions of the bar and to pay homage to the principle of stare
decisis. He always tried to build from within. Sometimes that was not possible,
for the break with the past was just too great. Yet, even then, Brennan's
inclination, once again rooted in a concern for the Court's authority, was to
minimize the disruption, and to find, if at all possible, a narrow path through
the precedents. Brennan also understood that reform as bold as the Court tried
to effectuate required a coordination, not a separation, of powers, and that
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gratuitous confrontations with the other branches were to be avoided. In fact,
as evident from Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, affirming
a broad conception of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, every effort was made to invite the other branches of government
to participate and collaborate in the program of constitutional reform then afoot.
Aside from a proper regard for institutional needs, a successful opinion
requires a mastery of legal craft, which Warren also found in Brennan. Justice
Brennan was as much the lawyer as the statesman. Law is a blend of the
theoretical and the technical, and though there were others as gifted as Brennan
in the formulation of a theoretical principle, there was no one in the ruling
coalition -- certainly not before Fortas's appointment - who had either the
patience or the ability to master the technical detail that is also the law.
Everyone on the Court, law clerk and justice alike, admired Brennan's command
of vast bodies of learning, ancient and modem. He knew the cases and the
statutes, and how they interacted, and understood how the legal system worked
and how it might be made to work better. He was the lawyer's judge.
Even Brennan's most theoretically ambitious opinions, like New York Times
v. Sullivan, bear the lawyer's mark. In that case Justice Brennan spoke of the
national commitment to a debate on public issues that is "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," and he has been justly celebrated many times for reformulating
the theory of freedom of speech associated with the work of Alexander
Meiklejohn in a fresh and original way. Meiklejohn, then in his nineties, saw
Brennan's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan "as an occasion for dancing
in the streets." Of even greater importance to the lawyers and judges among us
(Meildejohn was a political theorist) was Brennan's analysis of the common law
of libel and his deft reformulation of doctrine - the announcement of the "actual
malice" requirement - in order to create a rule that, one, would be operational
and, two, would effectuate a just accommodation of reputational interests and
democratic values. New York Times v. Sullivan is a great decision, a
fountainhead of freedom in our day, because it is an exercise in political
philosophy made law.
In 1968, Richard Nixon ran against the Warren Court, and with victory in
hand made a number of appointments that ushered in a new phase of Supreme
Court history. Due to many fortuities, he had the opportunity to replace Earl
Warren, Abe Fortas, and Hugo Black, and then in 1975, during the Ford
presidency, William Douglas retired. The life of the Warren Court was over
and Justice Brennan found himself working in a wholly new environment. No
longer a dominant figure in the ruling coalition, he became part of the
opposition, pitted against a majority driven by a contrary vision of American law
and life. The new majority believed that the doctrine of the Warren Court was
mistaken and had to be limited, corrected, and perhaps even eradicated.
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Coping with this new situation was not easy for Justice Brennan. It proved
to be a test of sorts, and as such brought to the fore many of his strengths.
Value commitments that were shared in the sixties became distinguishing
features of the Justice in the seventies and eighties and, as a result, are now
recognized as a source of his identity and also his greatness. In some instances,
his understanding of the Constitution evolved over time. For the most part,
however, the seventies and eighties were for Brennan a period devoted primarily
to defending the Warren Court's interpretations of the Bill of Rights and Civil
War Amendments. As a result, the nation learned what his clerks knew first
hand -- namely, that the Justice is extraordinarily strong-minded. On issues of
detail Brennan is conciliatory, but when it comes to what he regards as matters
of principle, he is adamant and, in the best sense of the word, stubborn.
This stubbornness expressed itself in many ways, not the least of which was
the profusion of dissents during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet they were not the
core of his mission. At the occasional law clerk dinners held during this period,
he would wryly announce the tallies to the assembled. We would cheer the
resistance offered by his dissents. But it was obvious that the Justice's true
source of pleasure came in the cases in which he somehow - miraculously, I
think -- formed a majority that preserved the achievements of the Warren Court.
Justice Brennan's last term on the Court was marked by a large number of
dissents, but of equal, even greater, significance is the fact that in two important
cases - one involving flagburning, the other patronage - he was able to speak
for the majority in support of freedom of speech. It was entirely fitting that on
the last day of his last term on the Court, after almost thirty-four years of
service, he announced an opinion for a majority of the Court upholding an FCC
policy - born of another era - that favored minorities and women in awarding
broadcasting licenses. Later that afternoon, Justice Brennan received the
prognosis from his doctor that led to his decision to retire.
Justice Brennan is a proud man, not in the least bit arrogant - indeed he
is one of the most modest men I have ever known -, but he is someone who
takes a very special pride in his work. He is a fighte! who likes to win, and as
such, would be pained to see an earlier'.victory reveied, especially when the
new majority, also trying to build fr6m within, turned Brennan's doctrinal
creations to another purpose. The fight in Brennan no doubt accounted for the
sense of engagement that carried him through the seventies and eighties, and
helps explain the unusual role he created for himself during that period. It was,
however, dwarfed by an even more significant factor: his devotion to the
institution.
In the Warren Court era, this devotion accounted for Brennan's role as
Court spokesman and for the distinctive nature of his opinions. He took no
pleasure in speaking alone, but always tried to speak through the Court and to
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mold judicial doctrine in a way that was fully sensitive to the needs of that
institution. His first priority was to have the Court speak authoritatively and his
second was to produce an opinion that would strengthen the effectiveness of the
Court. He strove to avoid any gestures that would either dissolve or splinter the
majority, infuriate those on the other side of the bench, or set into motion a
political dynamic that would undermine the ability of the Court to achieve all
that it might. During the second half of his tenure, these same sentiments
shaped his strategy of resistance. Dissent was always a possibility, but his first
priority was that the Court speak to the issue in an authoritative manner, because
he continued to believe in the Court: law mattered. He remained committed
to working through the institution, not to propounding his views, speaking his
mind, or otherwise indulging himself. Dissent was a reluctant last resort almost an acknowledgment of failure.
In this way, Brennan served as the bridge between the Constitution that was
and the Constitution that is. He was the mediating force in the negative dialectic
between the Warren and Rehnquist Courts. Now there is no one on the Court
who can play that role, and the achievements of the Warren Court are imperilled
in new and profound ways. Of course, Justice Brennan has left us a written
legacy. The pages of the United States Reports are filled with his opinions, both
dissents and majority opinions. A few years back, another of his law clerks
surveyed the leading casebooks on constitutional law and reported that of all the
so-called "principal" cases featured in those books, Justice Brennan had written
more than any other justice in the entire history of the Supreme Court. These
opinions define the field within which the present Court operates; for some they
will act as constraints, for others a resource. But these opinions will not
compensate for the loss of Brennan's vote, even less for his absence within the
councils of the Court.
During the October 1965 Term, the Court's conferences were held on
Fridays. Later that day, or more commonly on Saturdays, when the Justice
would regularly have lunch with his clerks, he would describe what transpired
at conference, or at least what he thought we should know about the conference.
Some sense of the inner workings of the Court was also conveyed during the
dinners he had with his clerks during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that
time the law clerk dinners were an annual event and the number of former
clerks small enough that we could sit around a table upstairs at the Occidental.
Those were also the days - prior to the publication of The Brethren - when he
could assume that law clerks could be trusted with a confidence. The Justice
was not a man for gossip, or small talk about his colleagues (though his interest
in the personal lives of his clerks was boundless - he treated us as members of
his family). But he saw himself as a teacher, supplementing and enriching what
we might have learned in the classroom. He believed that understanding the
dynamics among the justices was a crucial part of our education, especially if,
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as he hoped, we would ourselves go on to become teachers. He wanted us and
our students to know how law was truly made.
His role in the deliberations was not the principal point of these

conversations, but one could see in an instant how the personal qualities that
drew us to the man -- the quickness and clarity of his mind, the warmth of his
personality, the energy that he brought to argument, his sensitivity to the views
of others -- were present in the Conference Room and, even more, accounted
for much of what happened there. In conference, Justice Brennan always had
more than one vote. Who could possibly resist him when he grabbed you by the
elbow, or put his arm around your shoulder, and began, "Look, pal... "?
The Constitution has lost a great friend. The bar and academy understood
his special role on the Court and thus received the news of his retirement with
great concern. His decision to step down added to the sense of disenchantment
and alienation from the Court that had been growing during the 1970s and
1980s. Justice Marshall's retirement the very next term exacerbated the
situation. One's despair only deepens at the thought of their replacements.
In coming to terms with this despair, I often remember with admiration
Justice Brennan's attachment to the Supreme Court as an institution. It is this
attachment that unifies the two phases of his career and accounts for the unusual
role that he created for himself during the last fifteen or twenty years, as he saw
so many of the achievements of the Warren Court being dismantled and
destroyed. Justice Brennan served through this period of retrenchment in a
cheerful and determined manner, always with an unqualified devotion to the
Court. I wonder whether those, like myself, who wish to honor him and that
extraordinary age of American law that made the Bill of Rights one of our great
national treasures, might not look to him as an exemplar and an inspiration. He
resisted, tenaciously, but kept the faith - why can't we?
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